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Top Tens of 2013: Patent, Trademark,  
Copyright, and Trade Secret Cases 
By Stephen McJohn* 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1  In 2013, the Supreme Court continued its recent concentration on patent law. The 
Court decided four patent cases: it held isolated human DNA is not patentable; lawsuits 
alleging legal malpractice in patent cases are to be litigated in state, not federal, court; 
seeds grown from genetically modified patented seeds cannot be resold; and that reverse-
payment settlements between brand name and generic pharmaceutical companies are 
subject to scrutiny under antitrust laws. The only trademark case the Court decided 
addressed an issue with more impact on patent law than trademark law: whether a rights 
holder can destroy jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment case by promising not to sue. 
Meanwhile, a lower court imported into trademark law a principle from patent law: that 
fraud in the prosecution of a trademark may support an antitrust action. 
¶2  First sale, or exhaustion, proved to be a pressure point. Courts looked at how much 
control a rights holder has on authorized products released to the market. The Supreme 
Court held that copyright is not infringed when books printed overseas with the 
permission of the copyright holder (and intended for foreign markets) are imported into 
the United States. Other copyright cases addressed whether first sale authorized resale of 
digital works, whether a digital clipping service violated copyright, and whether an 
artist’s adaptation of authorized photo prints qualified for fair use. In patent law, the 
Court considered the application of exhaustion to an invention using one type of code—
modified DNA. While holding that exhaustion did not authorize the sale of second-
generation patented seeds, the Court carefully limited its holding to leave room for later 
case development, rather than making a broad holding with respect to such “self-
replicating” products like biotech and software. 
¶3  The holders of copyrights, patents, and trademarks often seek to use secondary 
liability to find defendants with deeper pockets and to cut off the infringing activity at a 
critical point in the supply chain. Although the rules on secondary liability are quite 
different in each area, the general principles show increasing convergence. For example, 
the owner of a swapmeet could avoid liability for known infringement by its vendors only 
by instituting a bona fide program to address infringement, rather than token measures—
a common law standard similar to copyright’s statutory scheme for internet service 
providers, who must administer a bona fide program to address notices of infringement. 
Analogously, in patent law, a party with good faith belief in non-infringement could not 
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be liable for inducing patent infringement. In addition to sale, another critical point in the 
supply chain is importation. In effect, the Supreme Court held that a copyright holder 
does not have the right to create separate foreign and domestic markets. In patent law, the 
Federal Circuit held that International Trade Commission procedures may not be used to 
exclude infringing products where there is no real domestic production or patent licensing 
program to protect. An ITC procedure thus may not be used simply for leverage where 
the dispute is limited to a single potential licensee. 
¶4   Courts continue to seek the borders of protectable matter, but in each area the 
border issues are quite different. Myriad, the DNA case, marks the third recent Supreme 
Court case seeking to differentiate patentable subject matter from the nonpatentable 
domains: abstract ideas, natural physical phenomena, and laws of nature. Despite the 
Court’s broad guidance, the lower courts have continued to find no clear boundary of 
patentable subject matter. Copyright cases looked to whether terraforming in a virtual 
world created a fixed copyrightable work and whether diagrams describing theories 
showed noncopyrightable ideas or copyrightable expression. These frontier issues, 
however, have perhaps less impact than the continuing issue of the extent of fair use. 
Trademark cases sought the line between protectable trademark and patentable functional 
matter. In trade secret law, an increasing split appeared with respect to how much 
protection information in computer systems would receive, especially where the 
information is protected less by security measures than by contracts, such as employment 
contracts or web site terms of use. 
I. PATENT 
A. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.1 
¶5  Myriad addressed an issue with considerable practical importance for 
biotechnology, but also one of philosophical interest: are human genes patentable? After 
decades of the Court not addressing the issue, Myriad is the third Supreme Court decision 
in the last four years on patentable subject matter. In 1980, the Court held in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty that a genetically engineered microorganism was patentable.2 Chakrabarty 
emphasized that not everything is patentable, repeating three judicially-created 
exceptions: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”3 Around that time, 
the Court also decided three difficult to reconcile cases concerning inventions involving 
computers: Gottschalk v. Benson,4 Parker v. Flook,5 and Diamond v. Diehr.6 Over the 
following decades, the Federal Circuit struggled to define the boundaries of the 
judicially-created exceptions, formulating a number of tests, including the machine-or-
 
1 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
2 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
3 Id. at 309 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-92 
(1978); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) 62, 112-21 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853). 
4 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
5 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
6 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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transformation test, the useful-concrete-tangible test, the rule against patenting “mental 
steps,” and the applied-algorithm test.7  
¶6  The Supreme Court returned to the issue of the scope of patentable subject matter 
in 2010, holding in Bilski v. Kappos that the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation 
test should not determine patentable subject matter.8 Bilski held that a broadly claimed 
method of hedging was an abstract idea and so not patentable.9 The Court then addressed 
the exception for laws of nature in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., holding a diagnostic method was not patentable.10 The claimed 
method, which consisted of measuring metabolite levels in the patient’s blood and 
adjusting medication accordingly, simply identified a law of nature—the relationship 
between metabolite levels and the effect of medication—and then followed “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists who work 
in the field.”11 
¶7  Myriad addressed the remaining exception to patentable subject matter: physical 
phenomena. This exception clearly bars a patent on a human gene as that gene appears in 
the body, but Myriad provides some guidance on how different a chemical must be from 
the natural form to be patentable. The Court held that a patent was not available for 
isolated DNA, “specific segments of DNA—for instance, a particular gene or part of a 
gene—which can then be further studied, manipulated, or used.”12 DNA identical to that 
in the body is not patentable, although its shape is different and it is no longer entangled 
with other materials.13 Patent protection can be obtained, however, for complementary 
DNA, a synthetic molecule which consisted only of the DNA which matched the 
sequence in humans that codes for genes.14 In effect, Myriad’s patents were not valid 
where they simply claimed DNA sequences matching those in the body (a product of 
nature), but were valid where they claimed portions of DNA sequences (a “molecule that 
is not naturally occurring”) created by discarding DNA that did not code for amino 
acids.15  
¶8  The practical effect of Myriad may not be great. Myriad’s DNA patents would have 
expired in 2015.16 Isolated DNA claims are evidently invalid, but claims on 
complementary DNA, along with method claims, may still be enforced. Indeed, Myriad 
has actively enforced its other claims after the decision.17 More broadly, it remains to be 
seen how Myriad applies to other inventions closely related to scientific discoveries, such 
as molecules crafted to have the same property as newly-discovered natural molecules. 
Myriad does clarify that the three exceptions—“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
 
7 See Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2010: Patent and Trademark Cases, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 313, 314 (2011) (quoting In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
8 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225-27 (2010). 
9 Id. at 3231. 
10 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297-98 (2012).  
11 Id. at 1298. 
12 Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2112. 
13 Id. at 2118. 
14 Id. at 2119. 
15 Id. 
16 See Roxanne Nelson, Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to BRCA Gene Patents—Again, MEDSCAPE 
(Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/778197. 
17 See Complaint at 5, Univ. of Utah Research Found. vs. Ambry Genetics Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00640-
RJS (D. Utah  July 7, 2013). 
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abstract ideas”18—are not independent; rather, the reasoning behind each will affect cases 
in the other categories. Myriad also takes a broad, practical approach to patentability, 
without seeking to draw predictable bright line rules. 
B. Gunn v. Minton19 
¶9  Courts often have to draw the line between federal law and state law in intellectual 
property cases. The question may be substantive, involving such questions as whether 
federal patent law preempts state trade secret law, or whether federal copyright law 
preempts state laws on misappropriation or rights of publicity. Gunn dealt with the 
jurisdictional issue of whether federal or state courts should hear malpractice claims in 
patent cases.20 The Federal Circuit had generally held that where such cases depended on 
interpreting patent law, they were subject to federal jurisdiction.21 The Supreme Court in 
Gunn cut back drastically on federal jurisdiction for state law malpractice claims 
involving patents. The Court reasoned that a malpractice claim based on alleged faulty 
patent prosecution involved not a real question of patent law, but rather questions of fact 
involving hypothetical patents.22 For federal jurisdiction, the patent issue must be 
“substantial.”23 Although the issue was substantial as between the parties, it was not 
substantial in terms of its impact on federal patent law:  
Because of the backward-looking nature of a legal malpractice claim, the 
question is posed in a merely hypothetical sense: If Minton’s lawyers had raised a 
timely experimental-use argument, would the result in the patent infringement 
proceeding have been different? No matter how the state courts resolve that 
hypothetical “case with a case,” it will not change the real-world result of the 
prior federal patent litigation. Minton’s patent will remain invalid.24  
The Court further reasoned that allowing state courts to address such hypothetical 
questions would not interfere with federal court power to decide patent issues because the 
state court’s interpretation would not be binding authority on federal courts.25  
¶10  Gunn’s specific holding will affect only patent malpractice cases. More broadly, it 
indicates the Supreme Court is less concerned than the Federal Circuit about the “patent 
appeals court” having an iron grip on patent law, subject only to the Supreme Court’s 
supervisory role. This could play into such issues as when the Federal Circuit is obliged 
to follow precedent from other circuits and whether the Federal Circuit must give 
deference to lower courts when hearing appeals on such matters as grants of attorney’s 
fees or patent claim construction.  
 
18 Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2116. 
19 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
20 Id. at 1062. 
21 See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 
(2007); Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, 504 F.3d 1281 (2007). 
22 Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067. 
23 Id. at 1065. 
24 Id. at 1066-67. 
25 Id. at 1067. 
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C. Bowman v. Monsanto Co.26 
¶11  Monsanto’s patented Ready Roundup seeds have “a genetic modification that 
enables soybean plants to survive exposure to glyphosate, the active ingredient in many 
herbicides.”27 When Monsanto sells those seeds to farmers, it cannot sue them for using 
the seeds. This unsurprising result flows from the doctrine of patent exhaustion: where 
the patent holder authorizes the sale of a product embodying the invention, the patent 
holder implicitly allows the owner to use the product.28 The “initial authorized sale of a 
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”29 Otherwise, every buyer would 
have to get an explicit license, which would unnecessarily complicate sales—or defeat 
their purpose.  
¶12  The issue in Bowman was whether patent exhaustion applies when the authorized 
seeds grow into corn and produce seeds of their own.30 The Supreme Court held that the 
second-generation seeds were “additional copies,” not subject to the patent exhaustion 
doctrine.31 The seeds could be used as feed (which Monsanto permitted), but not grown to 
make more plants, which in turn would make more seeds.32 Otherwise, farmers would 
“need only buy the seed once, whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or (as here) a grain 
elevator. The grower could multiply his initial purchase, and then multiply that new 
creation, ad infinitum—each time profiting from the patented seed without compensating 
its inventor.”33  
¶13  Biotechnology and computer science both involve self-replicating technology. How 
those technologies will develop is hard to predict. The Bowman court was careful not to 
create a strait-jacket for the future of patent law: “Our holding today is limited—
addressing the situation before us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating 
product. We recognize that such inventions are becoming ever more prevalent, complex, 
and diverse. In another case, the article's self-replication might occur outside the 
purchaser's control. Or it might be a necessary but incidental step in using the item for 
another purpose.”34 
D. Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis35 
¶14  When a patent case settles, the alleged infringer is likely to pay an agreed sum to 
the patent holder. In some pharmaceutical cases, the opposite happens. When a 
pharmaceutical patent holder sues the maker of a generic version of the drug, the parties 
may settle with the generic maker agreeing to stay out of the market for a period of time 
in return for a payment from the patent holder. This looks like an antitrust case, where 
competitors strike an agreement that will drastically affect the market price, because 
 
26 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). 
27 Id. at 1764. 
28 See id. 
29 Id. at 1766 (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008)). 
30 Id. at 1765. 
31 Id. at 1763. 
32 Id. at 1766-67. 
33 Id. at 1767. 
34 Id. at 1769. 
35 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
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generics generally sell for much less than branded pharmaceuticals. But the Eleventh 
Circuit had held, in line with a number of other courts, that such an agreement is 
“immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope 
of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”36 Such courts reasoned that a patent is 
intended to give control over the relevant market to the patent holder.37 Moreover, there is 
a strong policy in favor of encouraging settlement of disputes. Few disputes are as 
complex and expensive as pharmaceutical patents lawsuits. 
¶15  The Supreme Court took a different approach. A valid patent does give the right to 
control the market for the patented product.38 But, the Court noted, “[t]he patent here may 
or may not be valid, and may or may not be infringed.” 39  In addition, the patent does not 
prevent the sales of competing products that are not covered by the patent claims.40 
Making reverse-payment settlements immune from antitrust attack could allow holders of 
invalid patents to nevertheless control the market or holders of valid patents to extend 
their control beyond the patent.41 The Court did not hold that reverse payment settlements 
were presumptively violations of antitrust law, like price-fixing agreements between 
competitors. Rather, it held that such agreements would be subject to antitrust scrutiny 
under the rule of reason.42 A party complaining of the agreement, such as the Federal 
Trade Commission, would still have the burden of showing that its anticompetitive 
effects outweighed its pro-competitive effects.43 
¶16  The case could have considerable impact beyond pharmaceutical patent litigation. 
Potential competitors often enter into transactions involving patents, such as joint 
ventures, cross-licensing, marketing, and service agreements. Actavis makes it more 
likely that such transactions could be attacked on antitrust grounds. 
E. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp.44 
¶17  CLS Bank shows that although recent Supreme Court cases may have provided 
guidance on the scope of patent subject matter, they have left the boundaries uncertain. 
The entire Federal Circuit sat en banc to hear the case, but did not reach a clear 
conclusion. The patents at issue covered “a computerized trading platform used for 
conducting financial transactions,” which would reduce settlement risk by “relying on a 
trusted third party to ensure the exchange of either both parties' obligations or neither 
obligation.”45 A divided panel of the Federal Circuit had previously held that the claimed 
invention was not an unpatentable abstract idea like the method of hedging risk in Bilski. 
Rather, it was patentable as “the practical application of a business concept in a specific 
 
36 Id. at 2227 (quoting FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012)). 
37 See, e.g., Watson Pharms, Inc., 677 F.3d at 1306-07. 
38 Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
39 Id. (stating that the owner of a valid patent may “charge a higher-than-competitive price for the 
patented product. But an invalidated patent carries with it no such right. And even a valid patent confers no 
right to exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe.”). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 2236-37. 
43 Id. 
44 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), argued, 134 S. Ct. 734 (Mar. 31, 2014). 
45 Id. at 1274. 
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way.”46 The dissent viewed the asserted patent claims as “abstract ideas repackaged as 
methods and systems.”47 The judges voted to rehear the case en banc,48 but no specific 
view gathered a decisive majority. Rather, the court simply issued a four line, per curiam 
opinion affirming the holding of the district court that the claims were not directed to 
patentable subject matter,49 followed by lengthy concurring and dissenting opinions that 
set forth non-binding views of various groups of circuit judges. CLS Bank shows how 
elusive the boundaries of patentable subject matter remain. 
F. Soverain Software, L.L.C. v. Newegg, Inc.;50 Ceats, Inc. v. Continental Airlines, Inc.51 
¶18  Soverain Software collected considerable revenue by licensing a patent that 
covered online shopping carts.52 The Federal Circuit invalidated the patent on the grounds 
that the invention was obvious.53 The claimed invention, with broad application in 
electronic commerce, was held to be obvious in the light of a similar system, the 
CompuServe Mall, which operated on a pre-Internet network.54 The networks and 
software may have been different, but the court agreed with Newegg that “a person of 
ordinary skill could have adapted the CompuServe order command to known browser 
capabilities when these capabilities became commonplace, and that it was obvious to do 
so.”55  After Soverain Software, patents which simply involve translating activities to the 
Internet environment from other environments (whether computer networks or the “real 
world”) are very likely obvious. Genuine inventive activity must be required in adapting 
or reconceptualizing activities in order to qualify for patent protection. 
¶19  The court’s discussion of secondary considerations is also noteworthy. Commercial 
success may be a factor supporting a determination of nonobviousness. If a product or 
method is widely sold or licensed, that can indicate that it was not an obvious invention.56 
Soverain argued that its patented software had been sold and licensed to a good number 
of customers.57 But the court noted that the software itself was not used or was quickly 
abandoned by those who purchased it.58 Rather, “licenses were taken to avoid the costs of 
litigation.”59 Such success in obtaining licenses weighed little. This holding has 
considerable import for future cases involving patent assertion entities (also known by 
 
46 CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated, 484 F. 
App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
47 Id. at 1356. 
48 CLS Bank Int’l, 484 F. App’x at 559. 
49 CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1273. 
50 705 F.3d 1333 (Fed Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-477 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2014). 
51 526 F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
52 Joe Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” Patent and Saved Online Retail, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 27, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/how-newegg-crushed-the-
shopping-cart-patent-and-saved-online-retail/. 
53 Soverain Software LLC, 705 F.3d at 1347. 
54 Id. at 1338-41. 
55 Id. at 1340 (footnote omitted). 
56 King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1280-81 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
commercial success did not indicate nonobviousness, where no connection shown between the patented 
feature and the drug’s alleged commercial success). 
57 Soverain Software LLC, 705 F.3d at 1346. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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such terms as “patent trolls” and “non-practicing licensors,” depending on one’s point of 
view). Success in getting licenses may not be weighed as evidence that the asserted 
patent is a valid one. 
¶20  Ceats held that a software patent on a method of assigning airline seats was invalid 
because the invention was not new in light of references, which included technical 
specifications, a checklist, and user video.60 Akin to Soverain Software, Ceats shows that 
simply doing something in software for the first time should not support a patent. It 
likewise has broad implications for software patents, because software often involves 
taking existing processes and making them more efficient. 
G. Cooper Notification, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc.;61 Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc.62 
63 
¶21  Cooper Notification and Function Media reflect the important role claim 
interpretation plays in determining the scope of software patent protection. Cooper 
Notification owns a patent, based on an application filed in 2004, “which discloses a 
system of mass messaging in which a message is sent to one or more communication 
gateways that forward that message to individual users.”64 That could also describe 
Twitter. 
¶22  But patent rights depend not on the general description of the invention, but rather 
what the applicant specifically claims. The relevant claim is much more specific:  
12. A communication system comprising: 
 
60 Ceats, Inc. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 526 F. App’x 966, 970-73 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
61 545 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
62 708 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013). On the subject of claim interpretation, two cases illustrate the patent 
holder is stuck with the claims she drafted. In Alexsam, Inc., v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013), 
the patent holder was required to prove a negative; the patent claimed a payment system that, among other 
elements, included point-of-sale devices had not been modified. Because no witness testified that the 
device had not been modified, infringement was not shown. Id. at 1342. In Piggy Pushers, LLC v. Skidders 
Footwear, Inc., 544 F. App’x 984 (Fed. Cir. 2013), a patent that claimed a child’s sock was not infringed 
by a very similar device that was a shoe. Such cases do have the virtue of limiting patents to their claims, 
but may encourage circuitous drafting. 
63 U.S. Patent No. 7,409,428 B1 fig.1 (filed Apr. 22, 2004). 
64 545 F. App’x at 960.  
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a first messaging subsystem which may be coupled to an alert originator and to 
one or more communication gateways, wherein each of the gateways is also 
coupled to at least one user terminal, and wherein the first messaging subsystem 
associates a unique set of message parameters with each of the communication 
gateways; 
wherein the first messaging subsystem is configured to transmit at least one 
gateway message to a plurality of the user terminals via the one or more 
communication gateways, in accordance with each set of the unique message 
parameters for each communication gateway, upon receiving a first message 
from the alert originator; 
wherein the first messaging subsystem is configured to reformat, for each of the 
one or more gateway messages, the first message received from the alert 
originator to a format in which the communication gateway associated with the 
gateway message will accept and perform operations in response to the incoming 
gateway message; and 
wherein the first messaging subsystem is configured to form an address for each 
of the one or more gateway messages to include the domain name information 
associated with the communication gateway or the user identification information 
associated with the registered user receiving the second message.65 
Twitter’s service did not fall within the patent claim because Twitter does not send the 
same gateway message to all users; instead, it sends it to a location from which separate 
messages are sent out. It achieves the same result, but it is implemented differently.66 
 
65 Id. at 962-63. 
66 See id.  




¶23  Function Media likewise declined to read software patent claims broadly enough to 
cover later-developed technology. Search engine advertising did not infringe a software 
patent that relied on terms such as “seller,” “buyer,” “publisher,” and “media venues.”68 
Those terms would not be read in an unnaturally broad way to make them applicable to 
displays on search pages of internet users.69 
 
67 U.S. Patent No. 6,446,045 B1 fig. 4f (filed Jan. 10, 2000). 
68 Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1314-15, 1319-24, 1330. 
69 Id. at 1319-24. 
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H. Motiva, L.L.C. v. ITC70 
71 
¶24  A patent holder may use federal lawsuits against infringers. A more effective 
approach sometimes is to use a proceeding before the International Trade Commission to 
exclude infringing imports. This gets the articles before they reach the domestic market 
and avoids the substantive and procedural problems of suing foreign entities. Importers 
may be easier to identify than domestic infringers. A patent licensor may be able to 
exclude imports even if it could not get an injunction in court because reasonable royalty 
damages may be sufficient to show lack of irreparable harm.72 An ITC proceeding, 
however, may only be used if “an industry in the United States, relating to the articles 
protected by the patent . . . exists or is in the process of being established.”73 This 
 
70 716 F.3d 596 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Another important case for international enforcement, which 
sometimes can be best done using secondary liability, is Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013), which held that good faith belief in non-infringement negates the scienter 
requirement for active inducement. 
71 U.S. Patent No. 7.292,151 B2 fig. 4A, fig. 4B (filed July 22, 2005). 
72 eBay Inc v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-94 (2006) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rule 
that courts should issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional 
circumstances and requiring that courts consider such factors as whether  “remedies available at law, such 
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury”); Interdigital Commc’ns., LLC v. ITC, 
707 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that patent holder may bring ITC exclusion action even if patent 
holder does not manufacture the invention in the United States). Patent holders have had considerable 
success before the ITC, although that may be changing. See Michael G. McManus, Section 337 Caseload 
and Win Rate Revert to Norms, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 30, 2013, 10:39 AM), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/10/section-337-caseload-and-win-rate-revert-to-norms.html. 
73 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2006). 
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requirement of a domestic industry to protect can be met by showing substantial 
investment in licensing of the patent.74 
¶25   Motiva held a patent on a "Human Movement Measurement System."75 Motiva 
sought an ITC exclusion order to bar import of Nintendo video games. But the only 
investment in licensing that Motiva could point to was a patent lawsuit that it had also 
brought against Nintendo in federal court.76 “Motiva's litigation against Nintendo was not 
an investment in commercializing Motiva's patented technology that would develop a 
licensing program to encourage adoption and development of articles that incorporated 
Motiva's patented technology.”77 Licensing may be used as basis for ITC jurisdiction, but 
is not a general ground that any patent holder may use simply to get before the ITC.  
I. FRANDs and Frenemies: Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.78 
¶26  Microsoft and Motorola were both parties to standard-setting organizations that 
created industry standards for wireless communication technology. As part of joining, 
parties agreed to license patents necessary to implement the standards.79 They agreed to 
offer such licenses on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions ("RAND," 
sometimes known as FRAND by adding “fair”).80 Motorola offered to license its patents 
to Microsoft for use with the Xbox video game console and other products, but at a 
royalty rate higher than Microsoft was willing to pay.81 The court looked at a number of 
factors in arriving at a royalty rate, which was considerably below that which had been 
offered by Motorola. The court considered the list of factors that courts use in 
infringement actions in order to assess damages based on a reasonable royalty rate, 
appropriately modified to adapt to the context of standard-setting patents: 
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, 
proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the 
patent in suit. 
3. The nature and scope of the license. 
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent 
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses 
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly. 
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, 
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or 
whether they are inventor and promoter. 
 
74 Id. § 1337(a)(3). 
75 Motiva, LLC, 716 F.3d at 597. 
76 Id. at 597-98. 
77 Id. at 601. 
78 No. C-10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
79 Id. at *1-2. 
80 Id. at *2. 
81 Id. at *2-3. 
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6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products 
of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator 
of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed 
sales. 
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its 
commercial success; and its current popularity. 
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or 
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results. 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial 
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to 
those who have used the invention. 
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that use. 
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the 
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the 
invention or analogous inventions. 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business 
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
15. The amount that a licensor and a licensee would have agreed upon (at the 
time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying 
to reach an agreement.82 
¶27  This case sets an important precedent for industry standard patents that are subject 
to standard-setting agreements. Standard-setting organizations are common in a number 
of industries. Patents held by members often apply to the technology necessary to 
implement the agreed-upon standards. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola shows that courts, 
although often reluctant to set the terms of transactions, will set prices where necessary. 
The case also indicates that courts are likely to take the approach that once a patent 
holder has encouraged reliance on its invention in setting an industry standard, it will no 
longer have the ability to withhold permission until it receives agreement to the terms it 
sets, as is generally the rule.83 Rather, the court, borrowing from a measure of damages 
 
82 Id. at *17 (quoting Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970)). 
83 See id. at *18. 
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for patent infringement, sought to set royalty rates according to the terms that the parties 
would likely have reached in a hypothetical negotiation.84 
J. Rates Technology, Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc.85 
¶28  Rates Technology balances two policies with broad effect on patent litigation and 
licensing practice. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, a no-
contest clause in a patent license is generally not enforceable.86 To encourage parties to 
test the validity of patents, neither an agreement not to challenge the patent nor the 
doctrine of licensee estoppel prevent an alleged infringer from arguing that the patent 
should not have been issued.87 Otherwise, patent license agreements would routinely 
include no-contest clauses, barring challenges by licensees, the parties often most likely 
to have reason to complain of dubious patents. If Lear were taken to the extreme, 
however, it would be difficult to settle patent lawsuits. If no-contest clauses in settlement 
agreements were not enforced, an accused infringer could settle, then effectively renege 
by challenging the patent again. To facilitate settlement, courts have held Lear 
inapplicable to litigation settlement agreements.88 
¶29  Rates Technology involved an intermediate case—settlement of a dispute that had 
not yet resulted in a case filed in federal court. Although recognizing the importance of 
encouraging settlement, the court held that pre-litigation agreements not to contest patent 
validity were not enforceable. Without litigation, parties would not have the benefit of 
discovery to uncover documentary evidence and witness testimony that could clarify 
whether the patent was likely valid.89 Moreover, a contrary rule would encourage patent 
holders to characterize every license, where possible, as a settlement agreement. Many 
license agreements follow a cease-and-desist letter or other demand for payment, so 
characterizing licenses as settlements would be easily accomplished. 
II. TRADEMARK 
A. Already, L.L.C., dba Yums v. Nike, Inc.90 
¶30  Disputes about intellectual property rights often lead to lawsuits. Most often, the 
rights holder sues for infringement, seeking damages or an injunction. In some cases, 
however, the possible infringer will bring a declaratory judgment action, seeking 
clarification that it is not infringing, such as a ruling that a patent is invalid. The Federal 
Circuit had held that patent licensees in good standing could not bring declaratory actions 
against the relevant patent holder.91 The court’s theory was that if the licensee was in 
good standing and so not subject to suit, there was no controversy between the parties. 
The Supreme Court rejected that rule in MedImmune, holding that a declaratory judgment 
 
84 See id. at *20. 
85 685 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 932 (2013). 
86 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
87 See id. at 672-74. 
88 Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1367-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
89 Rates Technology Inc., 685 F.3d at 171-72. 
90 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013). 
91 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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action could be brought if there was an actual controversy, such as a dispute about the 
validity of the patent.92 After MedImmune, patent holders had to be more careful about 
asserting their rights. Before sending even a cease-and-desist letter, the patent holder had 
to consider the risk that the recipient would take it to court. 
¶31  Already addressed the issue of whether the rights holder can destroy jurisdiction by 
committing not to sue for infringement, and so making the dispute moot.93 Nike had sued 
Already, alleging infringement of its Air Force 1 trademark for shoes. Already filed a 
counterclaim, alleging that the mark was invalid.94 Nike later filed in court a covenant not 
to sue, and sought dismissal of both sets of claims.95 The covenant stated that 
[Nike] unconditionally and irrevocably covenants to refrain from 
making any claim(s) or demand(s) . . . against Already or any of its . . . related 
business entities . . . [including] distributors . . . and employees of such entities 
and all customers . . . on account of any possible cause of action based on or 
involving trademark infringement, unfair competition, or dilution, under state or 
federal law . . . relating to the NIKE Mark based on the appearance of any of 
Already’s current and/or previous footwear product designs, and any colorable 
imitations thereof, regardless of whether that footwear is produced . . . or 
otherwise used in commerce before or after the Effective Date of this Covenant. 96 
The Supreme Court held that “voluntary cessation” of enforcement could destroy 
jurisdiction, provided that it “could not reasonably be expected” to resume its 
enforcement efforts.” 97 Nike’s actions met the test because of the broad, irrevocable 
covenant not to sue, which covered not just Already, but also Already’s distributors and 
customers.98 There could no longer be fear of a trademark action, so there was no actual 
controversy for a court to resolve.99 
¶32  Already establishes that a rights holder may avoid litigation, but only by expressly 
and irrevocably abandoning the ability to sue. The case adds a new layer of strategy to 
intellectual property enforcement. 
B. Embarcadero Tech., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc.; 100 Kinbook, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp.101 
¶33  “RStudio” and “ER/Studio” were trademarks used in the software industry. At first 
glance, they seem confusingly similar, meaning that only the mark with priority would be 
valid.102 But a little explication showed that people in the relevant markets should be 
 
92 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
93 As the Court put it, “[t]he question is whether a covenant not to enforce a trademark against a 
competitor's existing products and any future ‘colorable imitations’ moots the competitor's action to have 
the trademark declared invalid.” Already, LLC, 133 S. Ct. at 725. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 728. 
97 Id. at 727. 
98 Id. at 728. 
99 Id. at 732. 
100 No. 91193335 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2013). 
101 490 F. App’x 491 (3d Cir. 2013). 
102 Embarcadero Tech., No. 91193335 at 25-26. 
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readily able to distinguish them. “R” is a computing language often used in connection 
with advanced statistics applications. “ER” referred to “entity relationships.” The marks 
find quite different uses in software, although they both deal with data. “Studio” is often 
used in software to refer to a development tool.103 Software makers that want broader 
protection must seek more distinctive marks. 
¶34  Kinbook likewise held that superficially similar marks were not confusingly similar 
in the marketplace context. “Kinect” for a hands-free video-game interface was held not 
to infringe “Kinbox” for social networking software.104 The first syllable, “Kin,” is 
similar.105 But its meaning is subtly but distinctly different in the two marks, connoting 
general social connection in the first and blood kinship in the second.106 The products 
might both be considered computer products, but in very different fields. 
C. Southern Snow Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc.107 
¶35  Southern Snow held that fraud in the prosecution of a trademark claim, as with 
patent, may be the basis of an antitrust claim.108 The 1965 Supreme Court decision in 
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., established that 
enforcement of a fraudulently obtained patent could be the basis of an antitrust action, as 
long as the other elements were shown.109 The question in Southern Snow was whether 
the doctrine would extend to trademarks. 
¶36  Patents, like copyright, give a set of exclusive rights. Only the patent holder may 
sell the patented invention. A patent does not necessarily establish a monopoly, because 
other goods may compete in the same market with the patented invention. But a patent 
can be a potent weapon against actual and potential competitors. A trademark gives a 
much narrower right, the right to prevent others from using confusingly similar symbols 
on competing goods. The Supreme Court, however, has held that an antitrust violation 
may rest on abuse of other types of administrative proceedings, such as opposition to 
granting a trucking firm an operating license.110 Moreover, dicta in earlier cases had 
stated that abuse of a trademark might be an antitrust violation.111 The Southern Snow 
court, although recognizing that only rarely would other necessary elements such as 
market power be shown,112 held that a cause of action could lie. 
 
103 Id. at 28-33. 
104 Kinbook, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 866 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
105 Id. at 463-64. 
106 Id. at 465-66. 
107 No. 06-9170 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 2013). 
108 Id. at 7-8. 
109 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). 
110 See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972). 
111 See Southern Snow, No. 06-9170, slip op. at 8 (“the enforcement of restrictive provisions in a license 
to use . . . a trademark may violate the Sherman Act.”) (quoting Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 
623, 652 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 82, 86-
87 (N.D.N.Y 1977) (holding “[t]here is no doubt that a trademark may be utilized in such a manner as to 
constitute a violation of antitrust laws,” and “trademark laws may not be used to monopolize with respect 
to a certain product”). 
112 See Southern Snow, No. 06-9170, slip op. at 8 (“Although it is equally clear that the nature of a 
trademark, which does not in any way represent a monopoly conferred upon a particular product, will make 
it particularly difficult to establish that ‘the plaintiffs' actions have led to or resulted in a dangerous 
probability that it will gain a monopoly over the product in issue.”) (footnote omitted) (quoting Car-
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D. Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega113 
¶37  For decades, Paddle Tramps sold paddles adorned with the insignia of college 
fraternities and sororities. Those organizations sporadically sent letters, either ordering 
him to cease and desist or inviting him to join in their licensing organization. Finally, 
they sued for infringement.114 Abraham upheld the ruling that the proprietor of Paddle 
Tramps was not entitled to damages. Laches may bar damages where a plaintiff 
inexcusably delays bringing suit and a damages award would cause undue prejudice to 
the defendant. The decades of inaction with knowledge of the alleged infringement while 
Paddle Tramps further invested in the business met that standard.115 Although plaintiffs 
did not receive the remedy of damages, the court did uphold an injunction against further 
infringement.116 It found prejudice to Paddle Tramps was outweighed by the policy of 
avoiding consumer confusion as to endorsement of the paddles by the fraternities and 
sororities.117 In effect, laches acted as a revocable license. The trademark holders’ delay 
allowed Paddle Tramps to use the marks without payment, but by bringing the action 
they terminated that implied permission. 
E. Groeneveld Transportation Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore International, Inc.118 
119 
 
Freshner Corp., 438 F. Supp. at 87).  
113 708 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 88 (2013). 
114 Id. at 617-18. 
115 Id. at 622-25. 
116 Id. at 627-28. 
117 Id. at 627. 
118 730 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2013). 
119 Id. at 501.  
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¶38  Product design is protected as a trademark only if it is not functional. Groenveld 
claimed trade dress protection in the design of the base and reservoir of a grease pump.120 
It alleged Lubecore infringed by copying that design, rather than using an alternative. 
Groenveld argued that the design was not functional because many other designs could 
accomplish the same task. Indeed, other competitors in the market used different 
configurations. Because the design was not a competitive necessity, Groenveld argued, it 
was not functional.121 
¶39   The court rejected that argument, holding that competitors are not required to look 
for alternative designs to avoid infringing product design trade dress. Otherwise, a party 
could effectively have exclusive rights in utilitarian aspects of a product, the equivalent 
of a patent, under trademark law. Rather, competitive necessity only comes into play in 
“esthetic functionality” cases, where a feature that is normally esthetic (such as color) 
becomes functional because consumers require products in that market to bear that color, 
for a reason other than the reputation of the seller.122 
F. Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow123 
¶40  Internet service providers can avoid liability for their customers’ copyright 
infringement by instituting programs to respond to notices of infringement, terminate 
accounts of repeat infringers, and address cases of known infringement.  The copyright 
statute sets out a detailed statutory scheme.124 Goodfellow looked at the issue of 
secondary liability in trademark, in the low-tech setting of a swap meet. Coach sent a 
number of letters putting Goodfellow, the swap meet operator, on notice of sales of 
counterfeit Coach goods.125 In the ensuing litigation, Goodfellow argued that it should not 
be liable for the infringement by vendors.126 Goodfellow took a number of remedial 
measures: “Goodfellow distributed pamphlets to vendors, posted copies of a ‘counterfeit 
is prohibit’ sign, and called a meeting with vendors to address the selling of counterfeit 
goods.”127 But the program was executed in perfunctory fashion:  
However, the pamphlets were distributed randomly and incompletely; the signs 
that were posted were actually intended to address a growing problem with 
counterfeit currency, not counterfeit products; attendance at the meeting with 
vendors, scheduled on a day when the flea market was not open for business, was 
voluntary and attended only by some vendors; and communication was frustrated 
by language differences.128  
Goodfellow uses common law theories of secondary liability in trademark to create 
similar incentives to the statutory scheme of safe harbors in copyright.129 Service 
 
120 Id. at 504.  
121 Id. at 504-09.  
122 Id. at 506.  
123 717 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2013).  
124 See 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
125 Coach, Inc., 717 F.3d at 500. 
126 Id. at 501-02. 
127 Id. at 501. 
128 Id. 
129 See id. at 504-05. 
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providers may avoid liability for their customers’ actions only by putting into effect bona 
fide programs to address notices of infringement and deal with known infringers.  
G. Eastland Music Group, L.L.C. v. Lionsgate Entertainment, Inc.130 
¶41  As the Seventh Circuit noted, Eastland Music’s rap duo Phifty-50, “according to its 
web site www.phifty-50.com, has to its credit one album (2003) and a T-shirt.”131 
Eastland brought a trademark infringement alleging that Lionsgate infringed the Phifty-
50 mark by titling a movie “50/50.”132 The court affirmed dismissal of the case.133 The 
decision is notable because the court ruled as a matter of law that “50/50” for the title of a 
movie about someone with even chances of surviving cancer could not cause confusion 
with “Phifty-50.”134 The case could be dismissed at the outset, without the defendant 
incurring the costs of discovery, let alone a trial. This makes it less likely in a clear case 
that the defendant will simply settle in order to avoid the costs of depositions, 
interrogatories, market surveys, consultants and other costs of trademark litigation.135 
¶42  The case is also notable for a leading federal judge nonchalantly relying on 
Wikipedia:  
The phrase 50/50 or a sound-alike variant (50-50, fifty-fifty, fifty/fifty) has been 
in use as the title of intellectual property for a long time. Wikipedia lists eight 
films with that title, opening in 1916, 1925, 1972, 1981, 1982, 1992, 2004, and 
2011. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50/50. Six of these movies predate 
Eastland Music’s use. The 1982 film is by and about a rock band. Wikipedia lists 
three TV shows with that title, plus an episode of a fourth show. It also lists three 
songs whose titles contain the phrase 50/50. One of these is Frank Zappa’s 1973 
song “50/50”. Then there’s “50/50 Luv” released in 1995 by the rap group B.G. 
Knocc Out & Dresta.136 
¶43  A civil procedure purist might quibble with the court foreclosing discovery by the 
parties, but relying on market information outside the record. 
H. Nguyen v. Biondo137 
¶44  Nguyen shows that the policies with respect to encouraging challenges to invalid 
intellectual property remain quite different in patent and trademark. Defendants 
purchased a hair and nail salon and, contrary to the sales agreement, continued to use its 
trademark, “Tipsy.”138 Sued for infringement, defendants contended that the mark was 
 
130 707 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 204 (2013). 
131 Id. at 870. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 872. 
134 Id. at 871. 
135 See id. at 870 (“Eastland Music tells us that, had the complaint survived a motion to dismiss, it would 
have served extensive discovery requests, and it seems confident that defendants would have settled rather 
than borne the expense of compliance.”). 
136 Id. at 871. 
137 508 F. App’x 932  (11th Cir. 2013). 
138 Id. at 934. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 4  
 
 196
invalid for “naked licensing,” meaning that the mark had been licensed without control 
and so no longer served as a trademark.139 But the court applied the doctrine of licensee 
estoppel, which prevents a licensee from contesting the validity of the mark, on the 
theory that the licensee has agreed that the mark is valid by licensing its use.140 In patent 
law, as discussed above, even a licensee’s explicit promise not to contest validity does 
not prevent a challenge to validity.141 




¶45  In contrast to Eastland,145 Kelly-Brown reversed the grant of a motion to dismiss, 
holding that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged that there was a likelihood of confusion 
between the use of “Own Your Power” as a service mark for a motivational services 
 
139 Id. at 7-8. 
140 Id. at 8. 
141 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
142 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013). 
143 Id. at 299. 
144 Id. at 301. 
145 See supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text. 
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business and the use of the same phrase in the magazine of media magnate Oprah 
Winfrey. The Fourth Circuit rejected the trademark-use approach espoused by the Sixth 
Circuit. Under that analysis, a court first determines whether the defendant used the 
symbol as a mark before looking to whether that use is likely to cause confusion.146 
Applied to this case, a court could have held that the magazine used the phrase, but not as 
a trademark, and so did not infringe (although the court’s analysis on other issues 
indicated that it would find plausible allegation of trademark use in this case). That 
analysis allows trademark cases to be decided without going through the multi-factor 
likelihood of confusion analysis. It also allows something of a safe harbor, giving parties 
notice that they can use well-known phrases without fear of trademark claims, where they 
do not use the phrases as marks. This split between the circuits could ripen the issue for 
Supreme Court review. 
J. Snap-on Inc. v. Scotese147 
¶46  A trademark owner seeking handover of an internet domain related to the 
trademark may use litigation in federal court or arbitration under the UDRP. In both 
settings, whether the registrant acted in “bad faith” is likely to be the determinative 
issue.148 Case law continues to give content to that vague standard.  
¶47  Snap-On Incorporated brought a UDRP proceeding seeking turnover of the domain 
snaponsocks.com. Snap-On argued that the offer to sell Snap-On the domain for 
$195,000 was evidence of a bad faith intent to profit.149 But the panel considered that 
Snap-On had initiated the negotiations, but had declined to name a price. The panel 
construed that tactic as an attempt to bring out a high offer in order to lay the foundation 
for a bad faith claim.150 As a result, the asking price was not held to be evidence of bad 
faith in registration and use of the domain.  The panel also considered the claim of bad 
faith undercut by the fact that the respondent created its own amateurish-looking website, 
rather than taking the easier route of copying such elements as the font and text colors of 
Snap-On’s site. 
K. AirFX.com v. AirFX, L.L.C.;151 Paul v. DN Capital Inc.152  
¶48  These cases are also cautionary tales for trademark enforcement. AirFX held that a 
trademark owner that pursued groundless and unreasonable counterclaims in an Anti-
Cybersquatting Act case would be liable for attorney’s fees. Paul reflects the increasing 
 
146 Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d at 305-08. 
147 Case No. D2013-0577 (WIPO May 9, 2013) (Albert, Arb.), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/word/2013/d2013-0577.doc.!
148 For example, to obtain handover of a domain under the UDRP, the applicant must show, among other 
things, “why the domain names should be considered as having been registered and being used in bad 
faith.” Rules for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy para. 3(b)(ix)(3), ICANN (Oct. 30, 
2009), http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/rules.  There is also liability under the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act if a person “registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name” with “bad faith intent to 
profit” from a trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
149 Snap-On Inc., No. D2013-0577, at 2. 
150 Id. at 6. 
151 No. CV 11-01064-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL 857976 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2013). 
152 Case No. D2013-371 (WIPO May 11, 2013) (Gibson, Arb.). 
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willingness of WIPO panels to refuse requests for domain name handovers. The Ron Paul 
election organization sought the domains ronpaul.com and ronpaul.org from a former 
campaign worker. The domain owner offered to hand over ronpaul.org and to sell 
ronpaul.com. The election campaign turned instead to a WIPO arbitration proceeding. 
However, the panel determined that the domain owner had a legitimate noncommercial or 
fair use, because the respondent used the domain to link to a legitimate, independent fan 
site and the site sold goods and services that promoted Ron Paul.153  
III. COPYRIGHT 
A. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.154 
¶49  Kirtsaeng, like the International Trade Commission cases in patent law discussed 
above,155 shows a rights holder seeking to cut off the flow of goods at a critical point—
importation. Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, studied mathematics at Cornell 
University. Noticing that textbooks in the United States were pricier than their overseas 
edition, he saw an arbitrage opportunity. He had friends and family purchase the Asian 
editions in Thailand and ship them to him for resale at a profit.156 The first sale doctrine 
generally allows the owner of an authorized copy to resell it. But first sale applies only to 
a copy “lawfully made under this title.”157 The Second Circuit held that the first sale 
doctrine did not apply to copies printed abroad because U.S. copyright law applies only 
within the United States.158 A copy “made under this title,” on that reading, must be made 
where U.S. copyright law (Title 17 of the United States Code) applies. Kirtsaeng 
contended that “lawfully made under this title” meant simply that making the book was 
not unlawful under U.S. copyright law. Wiley authorized its Asian editions, so first sale 
would allow a buyer to resell an authorized copy.159 
¶50  The Court looked to the provision’s interplay with various other parts of the 
Copyright Act, such as provisions that make importation an infringement of the 
distribution right and provisions that protect the copyrights of foreign authors.160 The 
issue requires unraveling the copyright owner's right of public distribution, its lesser 
included rights of importation, and the first sale doctrine's limitation on the distribution 
right.161 There are policy arguments for enforcing geographic limits. A publisher could 
rely on the rule to make less expensive editions available in developing countries, without 
imperiling its domestic market price. The Court did not discuss that argument but 
 
153 The panel further stated that “the combination of political speech engaged in by Respondent, the 
substantial lack of commercial intent, and the offer by Respondent to provide the Domain Name to 
Complainant for free, makes it unlikely to this Panel that Complainant would have succeeded in 
demonstrating bad faith registration and use.” Id. at Section 6.B. 
154 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
155 See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. 
156 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1356. 
157 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008). 
158 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1357 (citing 654 F.3d 210, 218-19 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
159 Id. at 1358. 
160 Id. at 1361-62. 
161 Id. at 1354 (quoting statutory language granting distribution right in 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)); Id. at 1354-
55 (quoting statutory language providing for first sale rights in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)); Id. at 1367 (quoting the 
Copyright Act’s “importation provision,”17 U.S.C.§ 602(a)(1)). 
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implicitly rejected it, stating that “[a] publisher may find it more difficult to charge 
different prices for the same book in different geographic markets. But we do not see how 
these facts help Wiley, for we can find no basic principle of copyright law that suggests 
that publishers are especially entitled to such rights.”162  But perhaps the determinative 
factor in resolving how to read the murky language was that “reliance upon the ‘first sale’ 
doctrine is deeply embedded in the practices of those, such as booksellers, libraries, 
museums, and retailers.”163 If first sale had a geographic limit, then a book printed in 
France could not be sold at a bookstore or loaned by a library. A museum could not 
exhibit an African sculpture. A gallery could not sell a painting purchased abroad.  




¶51  Photographer Harney took a photo of socialite Clark Rockefeller and his daughter 
leaving a Boston church. Not too long after, Rockefeller was exposed as an impostor, 
Christian Karl Gerhartsreiter. The photo was published widely, including an FBI 
"Wanted" poster, as the police hunted Gerhartsreiter. A made-for-TV movie recounted 
the tale, using its own version of the photo without permission from Harney.166 
¶52  Copyright protects only original creative expression. The court recognized the 
creativity in composing the picture, but held that Sony copied only unprotected facts: 
“Harney's creation consists primarily of subject matter—‘facts’—that he had no role in 
creating, including the central element of the Photo: the daughter riding piggyback on her 
father's shoulders.”167 The image became famous, but “we do not see how subsequent 
events can fortuitously transform unoriginal elements of a visual work into protectible 
subject matter.”168  
 
162 Id. at 1370. 
163 Id. at 1366. 
164 704 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2013). 
165 Id. at 189. 
166 Id. at 176. 
167 Id. at 184. 
168 Id. at 186. 
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¶53  In a world where video and pictures increasingly capture everything (from security 
cameras to Google Glass), Harney may affect how those that initially capture an image 
control its future. 
C. FireSabre Consulting L.L.C. v. Sheehy169 
170 
 
¶54  Copyright subsists in a creative work when the work is “fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression.”171 FireSabre, a consultant, assisted a school in building an 
educational project in the virtual world Second Life. FireSabre terraformed (used 
development tools to alter the topography and landscape) of several islands that students 
subsequently modified.172 As in many copyright cases, the relationship foundered and the 
parties disputed ownership of the work. The school contended that the terraforming work 
was not “fixed,” and so not subject to copyright. Rather than fixed for the ages, the work 
was subject to change.173 But “fixed” under the Copyright Act requires only that the work 
be "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”174 Now that many creative 
acts may be saved in digital form in games and in the course of everyday life, the holding 
has potential broad scope.  
 
 
169 No. 11-CV-4719 (CS), 2013 WL 5420977 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013). 
170 Id. at *1. 
171 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
172 FireSabre Consulting LLC, 2013 WL 5420977, at *1-3. 
173 Id. at *4-6. 
174 Id. at *6 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).  
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D. Cariou v. Prince175 
176 
  
¶55  Cariou published photos taken over six years in Jamaica in his book, Yes Rasta. 
Prince, a successful appropriation artist, tore photos from copies of the book and altered 
them with paint, printing, and pasted elements.177 Galleries exhibited Prince’s adaptations 
and sold them, some for upwards of two million dollars.178 The Second Circuit held that 
Prince’s adaptations did not infringe Cariou’s copyrights, but rather were protected as fair 
use. The court placed great weight on its determination that the use was “transformative,” 
a strong factor in favor of fair use.179 The Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell made 
the transformative nature of a work important by holding fair use protected a rap parody 
version of the song Pretty Woman.180 Cariou reads Campbell broadly. In particular, 
Cariou rejected the trial court’s reasoning that a transformative use must be one that, like 
the parody in Campbell, comments on or criticizes the first work, or provides similar 
functions like providing historical context. Prince testified that he did not really have any 
message, let alone commentary or criticism of the photographs.181 But Cariou looked to 
Campbell‘s broad language that a work may be transformative if it alters “the original 
with ‘new expression, meaning, or message.’”182 In the court’s view, Prince’s work did: 
“[t]hese twenty-five of Prince’s artworks manifest an entirely different aesthetic from 
Cariou’s photographs. Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and 
landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding 
environs, Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and 
provocative.”183 The court also saw little harm to the market for Cariou’s work because 
 
175 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
176 Id. at 702-03. 
177 Id. at 699. 
178 Id. at 709. 
179 Id. at 705-11. 
180 Id. at 706-07 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 706 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579). 
183 Id. 
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the artists served such different audiences.184 After Cariou, an author that borrows from 
another but produces a work that is much different, is more likely to qualify for fair use, 
even if the amount used is considerable.  
E. Sofa Entertainment, Inc. v. Dodger Products, Inc.185 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.186  
¶56  Sofa Entertainment and Green Day both involved minor uses of copyrighted works. 
Sofa Entertainment held that fair use applied to the musical Jersey Boys’s inclusion of a 
seven-second clip of Ed Sullivan introducing the Four Seasons.187 Green Day held that 
fair use applied to the use of a copyrighted street art illustration in a back-drop video used 
during concerts of the band Green Day.188 Both cases saw the use as transformative. The 
Ed Sullivan clip served as “evidence of the band's enduring prominence in American 
music.”189 The illustration was “only a component of what is essentially a street-art 
focused music video about religion and especially about Christianity.”190 
¶57  Both cases conflict with the leading case on music sampling, Bridgeport Music, 
Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,  which rejected fair use applied to sampling, the use of 
even small amounts of musical recordings.191 
F. AP v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc.,192 American Institute of Physics v. Schwegman 
Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.,193 Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc.194 
¶58  Meltwater held that fair use did not protect a news clipping service that located 
news stories of particular interest to its subscribers and provided clips to its customers. 
Meltwater's "Global Media Monitoring” service enabled "users to monitor the news 
based on the presence of certain words or phrases in news articles appearing on the 
Internet and to receive excerpts of those news articles. Meltwater use[d] automated 
computer programs or algorithms to copy or ‘scrape’ an article from an online news 
source, index the article, and deliver verbatim excerpts of the article to its customers in 
response to search queries.”195 Once again, the effect on actual and potential markets 
weighed heavily: “[b]y refusing to pay a licensing fee to AP, Meltwater not only deprives 
AP of a licensing fee in an established market for AP's work, but also cheapens the value 
of AP's work by competing with companies that do pay a licensing fee to use AP content 
in the way that Meltwater does.”196 The court distinguished the cases that had applied fair 
use to search engines. Rather than thumbnail versions of photographs or snippets of text, 
 
184 Id. at 708-09. 
185 709 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2013). 
186 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
187 Sofa Entm’t, Inc., 709 F.3d at 1276, 1280. 
188 Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1173-74, 1179. 
189 Sofa Entm’t, Inc., 709 F.3d at 1278. 
190 Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1176. 
191 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009). 
192 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
193 Civ. No. 12-528 (RHK/JJK), 2013 WL 4666330 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 2013). 
194 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
195 Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d at 543. 
196 Id. at 561. 
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as in those cases, Meltwater provided the very information sought and so replaced the 
original works.  
¶59  American Institute of Physics addressed the application of fair use to works with 
valuable information of a different sort. The court held fair use authorized a clipping 
practice quite different than Meltwater. American Institute of Physics held fair use 
allowed law firms to make and keep electronic copies of scientific and engineering 
articles related to patent applications. The law firm was required to submit copies to the 
United States Patent Office. The plaintiffs dropped claims that submission of copies to 
the USPTO was copyright infringement, but pursued claims that making and retaining 
copies was infringement. 197 The court saw little market harm, because patent lawyers 
were not in the typical market—“academics, physical scientists and researchers, 
engineers, educators, students, and members of the general public who want to read peer-
reviewed scholarly, highly specialized articles about the physical sciences and other 
scientific disciplines.”198 
¶60  ReDigi rejected fair use as a means to translate first sale rights to the digital world. 
First sale authorizes the sale or distribution of an authorized copy. Someone owning 
authorized copies of music on a CD or flash drive could sell it. ReDigi’s service offered 
the functional equivalent. Customers could sell music online by agreeing to destroy their 
own copies after a copy was delivered to the purchaser.199 But that process involved 
making copies and distributing them, for the purpose of sale.200 The court held fair use 
inapplicable on the grounds that “ReDigi facilitates and profits from the sale of 
copyrighted commercial recordings, transferred in their entirety, with a likely detrimental 
impact on the primary market for these goods.”201 Nor did the court read first sale to 
apply to the practice.202 The court, noting that the statute applies first sale only to a 
“particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title,”203 declined to extend the 
rights on policy grounds. Rather, it noted that the online world is different: “the first sale 
doctrine was enacted in a world where the ease and speed of data transfer could not have 
been imagined.”204 
¶61  ReDigi and Meltwater can both be seen as first sale cases. Meltwater could have 
bought paper copies of newspapers and cut out articles for clients. ReDigi could have 
operated a used CD store. Making electronic copies and distributing them is similar, but 
not close enough for courts.  
G. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.205 
¶62  Working with several research libraries, Google has scanned over twenty million 
books. As the court noted, the project provides several services. Google Books allows 
users to find books for purposes from research to inter-library lending to curiosity, and to 
 
197 Civ. No. 12-528(RHK/JJK), 2013 WL 4666330, at *3-4, *40-42. 
198 Id. at *31. 
199 ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d at 645-46. 
200 Id. at 648-52. 
201 Id. at 654. 
202 Id. at 654-56. 
203 Id. at 654 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012)). 
204 Id. at 656. 
205 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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find excerpts within books. Searches receive a snippet of relevant books, along with 
information about the book, often including where the book may be purchased.206 Google 
Books also “greatly promotes a type of research referred to as ‘data mining’ or ‘text 
mining.’ Google Books permits humanities scholars to analyze massive amounts of 
data—the literary record created by a collection of tens of millions of books. Researchers 
can examine word frequencies, syntactic patterns, and thematic markers to consider how 
literary style has changed over time.”207 Google has saved copies of out of print books 
that might otherwise have been lost over time. Digital copies can be adapted easily for 
readers with visual or other disabilities. Google Books also leads to sales of books.208 
¶63  In 2013, after nine years of litigation and attempts at settlement, the trial court 
granted Google summary judgment, on the grounds of fair use. The court found the use 
“highly transformative. Google Books digitizes books and transforms expressive text into 
a comprehensive word index that helps readers, scholars, researchers, and others find 
books. . . . Google Books is also transformative in the sense that it has transformed book 
text into data for purposes of substantive research, including data mining and text mining 
in new areas, thereby opening up new fields of research.”209 The court also found no 
market harm to authors, rejecting the theory that prospective readers might, rather than 
buy a book, use Google Books to read it one snippet at a time.210 In terms of fair use 
doctrine, this case is notable for extending the meaning of “transformative” to include 
uses that exploit non-copyrighted aspects of works. The result, however, is consistent 
with cases that applied fair use, albeit with different reasoning, to copying to get 
















206 Id. at 287-90. 
207 Id. at 287 (quoting Brief of Digital Humanities and Law Scholars as Amici Curiae at 1). 
208 Id. at 293. 
209 Id. at 291. 
210 Id. at 292-93. 
211 See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding fair 
use permitted copying for reverse engineering). 
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¶64  Copyright protects original, creative expression, not ideas or nonoriginal elements. 
Warrick argued he could copy diagrams created by Lippit because they simply embodied 
Lippit’s ideas about organizational management.214 But although “Lippitt's diagram may 
express an idea, Warrick could express the same ideas in his own fashion. He might have 
organized the components in a pie-chart-style format to show how each is a component of 
a larger whole. He could have approached the concept in a two-column format, listing 
each defect in the left column and the missing component in the right column.”215 
Warrick also argued the diagrams lacked the necessary creativity for copyright 
protection, consisting simply of typical diagram elements: “Warrick says the elements of 
Lippitt's diagram—short labels, shapes, symbols, and selection of typeface—are not 
eligible for copyright protection.”216  But any “copyrightable work can be sliced into 
elements unworthy of copyright protection. Books could be reduced to a collection of 
non-copyrightable words. Music could be distilled into a series of non-copyrightable 
rhythmic tones. A painting could be viewed as a composition of unprotectable colors.”217  
Warrick shows that a small contribution of creativity may give protection to a work that 
conveys mainly unprotected factual or functional information. 
 
212 717 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 2013). 
213 Id. at 1114. 
214 Id. at 1118. 
215 Id.  
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 1119 (citation omitted). 
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I. Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc.,218 Righthaven L.L.C. v. Hoehn219  
¶65  Copyright law does not allow debt collectors. If someone is owed a debt for an 
unpaid loan or a breached contract, they can sell that debt to someone else, who can sue 
to collect. But copyright limits standing; only the owner of a copyright or some of its 
exclusive rights may sue for infringement.220 3Taps and Righthaven both turned on the 
issue of whether a license conveyed sufficient rights for the licensee to bring a copyright 
infringement action. In both cases, the court held that the agreements did not transfer 
such exclusive rights.  
¶66  Righthaven held that an agreement transferring rights to sue for copyright 
infringement will not convey sufficient rights to support standing in a copyright 
infringement action.221 The right to sue is itself not one of the exclusive rights. 
Accordingly, Righthaven’s business model, which depended on simply obtaining the 
rights to sue from various copyright holders and then searching for likely licensees,222 
was not viable. Much possible infringement occurs in this digital age. Copyright holders 
will not be able to monetize it by transferring simply the right to sue, which would allow 
them to distance themselves from enforcement. 
¶67  Craigslist requires a different sort of choice. The terms of use for Craigslist 
provided that Craigslist “does not claim ownership of content that its users post.” The 
court rejected the rather hopeful argument that such terms did not convey ownership but 
did convey an exclusive license by negative implication, because previous terms of use 
had explicitly disclaimed an exclusive license. More definitive terms will be required to 
support the transfer of exclusive rights.223 Craigslist puts some website owners in a tricky 
position. If they wish to sue for infringement of material on the site, they must have their 
users agree to transfer exclusive rights, something users may not wish to give up. 
J. Gary Friedrich Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Marvel Characters, Inc.,224 Metropolitan 
Regional Information Systems v. American Home Realty Network, Inc., 225 Agence France 
Presse v. Morel226 
¶68  Much of intellectual property law is contract law. Marvel Characters shows that 
drafting a contract as broadly as possible is not always enough. The agreement 
expansively described the rights transferred: “forever all rights of any kind and nature in 
and to the Work.”227 But the agreement was not interpreted to necessarily convey the 
 
218 942 F. Supp. 2d  962 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
219 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013). 
220 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (“The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, 
subject to the requirements of § 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right 
committed while he or she is the owner of it.”). 
221 Righthaven L.L.C., 716 F.3d at 1172. 
222 See id. at 1168. 
223 Craigslist, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d  at 979-80. 
224 716 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2013). 
225 722 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2013). 
226 934 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
227 Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d at 310. 
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renewal term in the subject work, the Ghost Rider comics, because it did not specifically 
mention those rights (along with other ambiguities in the contract).228 
¶69  Metropolitan Regional addressed copyright’s statute of frauds. To effectively 
transfer a copyright or slice thereof, there must be a signed writing, under § 204 of the 
Copyright Act. That writing requirement can be met, the court held, under the Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, by a party clicking “Yes” to a terms of 
use agreement.229 Parties concerned about keeping their copyright should, before 
uploading works they have created, read the terms of use (not fun). 
¶70  Agence France Presse v. Morel held that Twitter’s terms of use did not give 
benefits to third parties. Twitter’s terms of use allowed use of photos by Twitter. That 
permission did not extend to the world (basic contract law on third party beneficiaries) 
and so did not permit various parties to publish photos taken from Twitter.230 The terms 
of use granted rights only to Twitter and its partners, and the court declined to read it 
beyond those literal terms: “[c]onstruing the Twitter TOS to provide an unrestrained, 
third-party license to remove content from Twitter and commercially license that content 
would be a gross expansion of the terms of the Twitter TOS.”231 The case emphasizes the 
role of traditional contract law in the continuing evolution of cyberspace law. 
K. Secondary Liability Cases 
¶71  AT&T was not secondarily liable for copyright infringement in mobile messaging, 
such as unauthorized forwarding of multimedia messages. AT&T had limited ability to 
control and supervise the content of messages, and no direct financial interest in the 
activity.232 By contrast, a website that suggested its users use BitTorrent to share movies 
and provided specific technical support to share and to circumvent controls was liable for 
inducement of copyright infringement.233 
¶72  Under the safe harbor provisions of § 512 of the Copyright Act, Internet service 
providers can avoid liability for material stored by users, provided they remove infringing 
content they have reason to know of, including responding to takedown notices.234 Video 
sharing service Veoh qualified for protection, where there was no showing Veoh failed to 
act upon knowledge of specific infringements.235 Veoh also implemented hashing 
software to identify infringers and terminated the accounts of repeat infringers.236 
Likewise, an ISP that gathered analytical data, such as search engine traffic and keyword 
 
228 Id. at 314-16. 
229 Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., 722 F.3d at 600-03. 
230 Agence France Presse, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 560-64. 
231 Id. at 562. 
232 Luvdarts, L.L.C. v. AT & T Mobility, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2013). 
233 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1031-39 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 
624 (2013); see also David v. CBS Interactive Inc., No. CV 11-9437 DSF (JCx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013) 
(holding that an article analyzing technical details of file sharing was not inducement of copyright 
infringement). 
234 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
235 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners L.L.C., 718 F.3d 1006, 1020-23 (9th Cir. 2013). 
236 Id. at 1012-13; see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2013 
WL  1987225, at *3-6 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013) (holding factual determination of actual knowledge or 
willful blindness required to adjudicate applicability of safe harbor). 
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ads, did not have such necessary awareness of infringement to destroy immunity.237 But 
an ISP would have to respond to takedown notices received, even if they did not come in 
the manner most efficient for the ISP’s operations.238 
¶73  The senders of takedown notices also have the duty to send them in good faith.239 
Sending a notice for works already known to be removed could rise to liability for 
misrepresentation.240 But one court held that investigating whether the posting was 
protected by fair use was not required.241 A midwife had posted a photo of herself making 
an obscene gesture, with a caption directed at a physician opponent. When the physician 
posted the photo on another blog, the midwife sent a takedown notice.242 Although the 
physician’s posting was likely fair use, sending the takedown notice was held to be in 
good faith.243 
L. Other notable copyright cases 
¶74  In WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc.,244 the Second Circuit upheld the view that using 
individual devices to capture, copy, and retransmit broadcast programming to subscribers 
was not an infringing public performance.  
¶75  In United States v. Liu,245 the Ninth Circuit held that criminal copyright liability 
requires that the defendant knew of the illegal nature of the activity.  
¶76  In Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby,246 certain famous comic books were held by 
the Second Circuit to be works made for hire, and so not subject to termination of 
transfers.  
¶77  In Gaylord v. United States,247 a court applied the hypothetical transaction test to 
find a reasonable royalty measure of damages in a copyright case, something done rarely 
in copyright cases but commonly done in patent cases.  
IV. TRADE SECRET 
A. Scienton Technologies, Inc. v. Computer Associates International Inc.248 
¶78  A product idea can be a trade secret. But it is no longer a trade secret if the idea is 
necessarily disclosed when the product is sold.249 The concept of combining several 
 
237 Obodai v. Demand Media, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2503 (PKC), 2012 WL 2189740, at *6-7, *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 13, 2012), aff’d Obodai v. Cracked Entm't, Inc., 522 F. App’x 41 (2d Cir. 2013). 
238 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., No. C 12-01521 WHA, 2013 WL 1899851, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. May 
7, 2013). 
239 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (stating that person sending takedown notice must include  “[a] 
statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”). 
240 Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, No. 10 C 6517, 2013 WL 4734002, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013). 
241 Tuteur, M.D. v. Crosley-Corcoran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 333, 342-43 (D. Mass. 2013). 
242 Id. at 335-37. 
243 See id. at 341, 343-45. 
244 Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, 2014 WL 2864485 (U.S. June 25, 2014). 
245 731 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2013). 
246 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013). 
247 112 Fed. Cl. 539 (Fed. Cl. 2013) (holding that USPS would be liable for $684,844.94 for using an 
image of the Korean War Memorial without the authorization of its sculptor). 
248 No. 04-CV-2652 (JS) (ETB), 2013 WL 1856653 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013). 
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existing computer programs could be valuable information. Once the programs were 
bundled and sold, the information would be readily available to others and not subject to 
trade secret protection.250 But there could be other causes of action, such as 
misappropriation of an idea, breach of contract, or unfair competition.251 
B. United States v. Howley252 
¶79  Howley illustrates how criminal liability under the federal Economic Espionage Act 
can ratchet up the stakes and means of enforcement in intellectual property cases. Wyko 
had a big contract to build big tires, but had difficulty in preparing the necessary 
machines. Wyko sought access to similar machines at a Goodyear facility. When 
Goodyear needed repairs that Wyko provided, Wyko sent not technicians, but key 
engineers on the tire project. They surreptitiously took photos and emailed them to their 
Wyko accounts. Wyko’s IT manager happened upon the photos while archiving emails. 
Concerned about illicit activity, the IT manager anonymously emailed the photos to 
Goodyear. The FBI was alerted and the engineers arrested.253 
¶80  To violate the Economic Espionage Act, the defendant must take trade secret 
information, which is information that is not readily available and is subject to reasonable 
security measures.254 Although the machines were not under lock and key, Goodyear took 
reasonable security measures: “Goodyear surrounded its Topeka factory with a fence and 
required visitors to pass through a security checkpoint. Before Roberts and Howley 
entered the factory, they had to obtain advance permission from Goodyear, sign 
confidentiality agreements and agree not to take photographs during their visit.”255 The 
security measures, and Wyko’s scheming to get at the information, was sufficient 
evidence that the information was not readily available through other means.256 
C. Daniels Health Sciences, L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Sciences, L.L.C.257 
¶81  Information compiled, selected, and filtered from public sources may be a trade 
secret. A physician compiled and analyzed scientific research with respect to a dietary 
supplement. The information was shown in a PowerPoint presentation to potential 
investors, but only if they signed nondisclosure agreements.258 Although the individual 
items of research were publicly available, the compilation constituted valuable 
information subject to reasonable security measures.259 
 
249 Id. at *2, *5-6. 
250 See id. 
251 See id. at *5. 
252 707 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2013). 
253 Id. at 577-79. 
254 Id. at 579. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 579-81. 
257 710 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2013). 
258 Id. at 581. 
259 Id. at 583-84. 
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D. Airwatch L.L.C. v. Mobile Iron, Inc.260  
¶82  Where a company licenses software to customers, there is normally no trade secret 
in the output the customers create using the software, such as the visible information and 
graphics that appear on the screen.261 But if the customers agree to keep the information 
confidential and the company takes sufficient measures to limit access to the software, 
such information may remain a trade secret, as in Airwatch.262 The case also illustrates 
courts’ dislike of deceptive actions to get information. The defendants used false names, 
addresses and other information to sign up as potential customers of a competitor.263 Such 
a defendant is less likely to get the benefit of what was, as the court noted, a close 
question on whether the information disclosed was a trade secret.264 
E. Aqua Connect v. Code Rebel, L.L.C.265 
¶83  Aqua Connect also shows how contracts can protect trade secrets, even after 
software has been delivered to potential customers. Code Rebel downloaded Aqua 
Connect’s Terminal Server software. Code Rebel agreed to the EULA, which prohibited 
reverse engineering. The EULA was for a 14-day trial period.266 Defendants argued that 
once the EULA terminated, they were no longer bound by the agreement not to reverse 
engineer the computer software.267 The court held that although their authorization to use 
the software expired, the obligation not to reverse engineer the software continued:  
“[a]dopting Defendants' interpretation of this EULA provision would require an absurd 
result where users can freely reverse engineer Plaintiff's software once the license 
expires.”268 The case illustrates an important practical point that parties who sign what 
they think of as temporary agreements may have obligations that continue on. Before 
signing a nondisclosure agreement, for example, someone should carefully read it and 









260 No. 1:12-cv-3571-JEC, 2013 WL 4757491 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 4, 2013). 
261 Id. at *4 (stating “‘details that ordinary users of the software could observe’ are not trade secrets”) 
(quoting IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at *1-2. 
264 See id. at *4-5. 
265 No. CV 11-05764 RSWL (MANx), 2013 WL 3820544 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2013). 
266 Id. at *3. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
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¶84  Most trade secret cases involve information like customer lists or computer 
program source code. At issue in Lamont was whether a “Treasure Map” was a trade 
secret. The Lopeno Prospect Treasure Map, drawn by a geologist rather than a buccaneer, 
showed the likely location of a large natural gas field. The map was used by former 
employees to lure investors in a new company and to build a well to mine the gas.271  The 
court held the map was a trade secret, even though the first company had shown it to 
some potential investors without getting them to sign nondisclosure agreements.272 
G. Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Services, L.L.C.273 
¶85  Where defendant used plaintiff’s trade secret fracking software, there was 
irreparable harm and a preliminary injunction was granted. Core Labs reflects the 
continuing strong protection given trade secrets where wrongful behavior has been 
established. 
H. Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, L.L.P.274 
¶86  A patented invention cannot be a trade secret because the patent discloses the 
technology to the world. In Accenture, the defendant allegedly used misappropriated 
software source code to build a competing product.  The plaintiff met its burden that its 
 
269 421 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. App. 2013). 
270 Id. at 206. 
271 Id. at 205-09. 
272 Id. at 226-27. 
273 F. App’x 904 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
274 716 F.3d 867 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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technology contained trade secrets by showing that it contained valuable information 
protected by reasonable security measures.275 The burden then shifted to the defendant to 
show that the information had been disclosed by plaintiff’s patents, thereby destroying 
the secret.276 The defendant argued that there could be no trade secret because the plaintiff 
had patents on the subject matter.277 However, the patents were not introduced as 
evidence.278 Accenture shows that trade secret litigation requires careful marshaling of 
evidence, not just reliance on generalities.  
I. CFAA Cases 
¶87  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act can be more effective than trade secret law in 
protecting “proprietary” information. Someone who “accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access” and obtains information may be liable under 
the CFAA.279 Courts continue to split on when computer access is unauthorized. In 
particular, the circuits have divided on whether access is unauthorized if someone with 
authority to access a computer breaches related rules, such as an employment contract or 
terms of use.280 Widespread debate about the scope and penalties of the CFAA was 
triggered by the suicide of Aaron Swartz, a noted software developer and open culture 
advocate. Swartz was under indictment for allegedly violating the CFAA by downloading 
academic articles en masse.281 
¶88  Defendants were held not to violate the CFAA when they, in the course of creating 
a competitor to their employer, copied files containing technical data, customer lists, and 
business information.282 “This Court declines the opportunity to expand the CFAA to 
include situations where an employee takes confidential information, using authorization 
given to him and controlled by his employer . . . .”283 Similarly, employees who emailed 
their employer’s business plans and customer data before leaving to work for a 
competitor did not engage in unauthorized use.284 Creating a false Facebook page or using 




277 Id. at 875. 
278 Id. 
279 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012). 
280 See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012), stating that “two 
schools of thought exist” and rejecting the view “promulgated by the Seventh Circuit . . . that when an 
employee accesses a computer or information on a computer to further interests that are adverse to his 
employer, he violates his duty of loyalty, thereby terminating his agency relationship and losing any 
authority he has to access the computer or any information on it.” Id. at 203 (citing Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC 
v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006)). It further agreed with the second view, “articulated by the 
Ninth Circuit,” that “interprets ‘without authorization’ and ‘exceeds authorized access’ literally and 
narrowly, limiting the terms' application to situations where an individual accesses a computer or 
information on a computer without permission.” WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC, 687 F.3d at 203 
(citing United States. v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). 
281 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/03/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology-aaron-
swartz-and-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act.html. 
282 Advanced Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, No. 11 Civ. 9505, 2013 WL 410873 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 
2013). 
283 Id. at *7. 
284 Power Equip. Maint., Inc. v. Airco Power Servs., 953 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (S.D. Ga. 2013). 
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CFAA.285 Forwarding an email from a listserv, even if contrary to the governing rules, 
did not violate the CFAA.286 
¶89  Other courts found CFAA violations in fact patterns turning on breach of contract. 
Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc. held a party’s authority to access the Craigslist site was 
terminated where Craigslist sent it a cease and desist letter for violating its terms of use 
and blocked access from IP numbers associated with it.287 Therefore, it is possible to 
violate the CFAA by accessing a website that is generally open to the public.  Further, 
allegations that parties gave members of their family their passwords and allowed them to 
access an insurance company’s computer system was deemed to plead unauthorized 
access.288 
V. PENDING: THE SUPREME COURT TOOK THE FOLLOWING CASES FOR REVIEW IN 2013: 
A. Alice Corp. Pty. Ld. v. CLS Bank Int’l, No.13-298 (U.S. cert. granted Dec. 6, 2013)  
Issue: The standard for determining whether computer-related inventions are within 
patentable subject matter. 
B. Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, No. 12-1128 (U.S. 2013)  
Issue: correct standard for burden of proof to support declaratory judgment of non-
infringement or invalidity of patent.289 
C. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
 No. 12-873 (U.S. argued Dec. 3, 2013)  
Issue: Which parties have standing to bring a false advertising claim under the federal 
Lanham Act. 
D. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., No. 12-1163 (U.S. cert. granted 
Oct. 1, 2013) and Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 12-1184 (U.S. 
cert. granted Oct. 1, 2013)   
Issue: Both involve when attorney’s fees are awarded to the successful party in a patent 
case—the standard of review on appeal and how to determine if a case is “exceptional” 
for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 285. The question presented in Highmark is, “Whether a 
district court’s exceptional-case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285, based on its judgment 
that a suit is objectively baseless, is entitled to deference.”290 Octane Fitness addresses 
 
285 Matot v. CH, 975 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Or. 2013). 
286 Stern v. Weinstein, 512 F. App’x 701 (9th Cir. 2013). 
287 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
288 See id. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Steele Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00784-MCE-DAD 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 104606, at *34 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2013). 
289The case was decided January 22, 2014, with the Court holding that the burden of proving 
infringement remains with the patentee where the licensee seeks a declaratory judgment against the 
patentee to establish that there is no infringement.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 
S. Ct. 843 (2014). 
290 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., No. 12-1163 (U.S. 
March 25, 2013). 
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whether the Federal Circuit’s test for granting attorney’s fees improperly limits the trial 
court’s discretion and favors plaintiffs.291 
E. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315 (U.S. argued Jan. 21, 2014)  
Issue: Whether the defense of laches for unreasonable delay in bringing a copyright 
infringement case may bar an action when the statute of limitations has not run. 
F. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc.,  
No. 12-786 (U.S. cert. granted Jan. 10, 2014) 
Issue: Whether a single entity must perform all the steps of a process to infringe a process 
claim in a patent, or if the actions of multiple defendants will suffice. 
G. Nautilus, Inc., v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., No. 13-369 (U.S. 2014) 
Issue: Whether the Federal Circuit’s test for patent claims being invalid for indefiniteness 
is correct when the test invalidates a claim only if it is “insolubly ambiguous.” 
H. POM Wonderful LLC v. The Coca-Cola Co.,  
No. 12-761 (U.S. cert. granted Jan. 10, 2014) 
Issue: Whether the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s provisions for labeling 
preempt actions for false advertising brought under the federal trademark statute. 
I. Am. Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,  
No. 13-461 (U.S. cert. granted Jan. 10, 2014) 
Issue: Whether a retransmission infringes copyright as a public performance when a 
separate antenna is used to retransmit to each of multiple customer
 
291 The question presented is, “[d]oes the Federal Circuit’s promulgation of a rigid and exclusive two-
part test for determining whether a case is ‘exceptional’ under 35 U.S.C. § 285 improperly appropriate a 
district court’s discretionary authority to award attorney fees to prevailing accused infringers in 
contravention of statutory intent and this Court’s precedent, thereby raising the standard for accused 
infringers (but not patentees) to recoup fees and encouraging patent plaintiffs to bring spurious patent cases 
to cause competitive harm or coerce unwarranted settlements from defendants?” Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 12-1184 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2013). 
